Book Review: in Defense of American Liberties: A History of the ACLU. by Samuel Walker. by Rabkin, Jeremy
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary
1991
Book Review: in Defense of American Liberties: A
History of the ACLU. by Samuel Walker.
Jeremy Rabkin
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rabkin, Jeremy, "Book Review: in Defense of American Liberties: A History of the ACLU. by Samuel Walker." (1991). Constitutional
Commentary. 481.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/481
300 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 8:300 
IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES, A HISTORY 
OF THE ACLU. By Samuel Walker.t Oxford University 
Press. 1990. Pp. xiii, 479. Cloth, $27.95. 
Jeremy Rabkin 2 
Samuel Walker, a professor of criminal justice at the Univer-
sity of Nebraska, is no critic of the ACLU. But he isn't much of an 
historian, either. His "history" does draw on extensive research in 
the organization's archives and interviews with a great many of its 
past and present leaders. He provides a wealth of information, 
much of it unflattering to the ACLU. But in Professor Walker's 
hands, the derogatory information is not very derogatory, and in-
deed the rest of American history appears as a mere foil for the 
exploits of the ACLU. The result is more like a family album than 
a searching analysis of the ACLU's achievements. Still, like many 
albums it conveys a good deal about the family. An outsider may 
tire of the endless smiling poses, but if he grits his teeth and keeps 
flipping through the pages, he can learn much about the family's 
cherished conceits--and much about those less attractive traits, to 
which it has grown so oblivious that it does not even bother to con-
ceal them. 
AMERICAN HISTORY, FROM A TO CLU 
It must be said, however, that Professor Walker's doting ap-
proach to his subject can be rather trying for those who do not 
share his enthusiasm. Like many reverent biographers, Walker is 
prone to exaggerate the importance of his chosen subject. Thus he 
is not content to tell us that the ACLU was one of the earliest and 
loudest advocates of President Nixon's impeachment as the Water-
gate scandals came to light. He feels obliged to trumpet this record 
by characterizing the "Watergate crisis" as "the most serious con-
stitutional crisis in American history." The Civil War seems un-
worthy of notice in this view-perhaps because the ACLU wasn't 
yet on the scene to take charge of the proceedings. Similarly the 
abolition of slavery and the ratification of the post-Civil War 
amendments, guaranteeing a wider federal role in the enforcement 
of basic rights, seems to count for little in Walker's version of 
American history. In his view, "the greatest advances in civil liber-
ties in American history" were "encompassed" in the decade be-
1. Professor of Criminal Justice, University of Nebraska. 
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tween the ACLU's Supreme Court victories in Brown v. Board in 
1954 and in the first amendment libel case of New York Times v. 
Sullivan in 1964. 
Walker does take note of earlier constitutional battles to defend 
the rights of dissidents during the First World War. In this critical 
hour, he intones, "freedom of speech ultimately survived but only 
because the wartime crisis galvanized a small group of Americans 
into fighting for it."3 This "small group"-needless to say-was the 
nucleus of the ACLU. Walker cannot even leave it at crediting the 
ACLU with ensuring that free speech "survived." A bit further 
along, he confides that the ACLU actually created the American 
tradition of free speech, ex nihilo: before the ACLU arrived on the 
scene, he tells us, there was "no tradition of free speech ... in either 
legal doctrine or public tolerance for unpopular views. The glit-
tering phrases of the first amendment were an empty promise to the 
labor movement, immigrants, unorthodox religious sects and polit-
ical radicals." 
Professor Walker takes the correctness of ACLU positions so 
much for granted that he ends up robbing the organization of the 
credit it may deserve for taking painful or difficult stands. In 
Walker's version of history, there were never hard choices to make. 
Thus he does not simply point to excesses or abuses in the national 
security efforts of the 1950s. He dismisses the entire cold war as an 
absurd misunderstanding: "The cold war [sic] was an irrational 
outburst, one of the many episodes of popular hysteria that punctu-
ate American history." 
Temporary compromises of civil liberty, no less than sustained 
injustices, all look equally "irrational" to Walker, because he never 
allows himself to consider that there are genuine conflicts that must 
be faced, even within a liberal society. He assures us, near the end 
of the book, that fights for the "principles of the Bill of Rights" 
often require "defense of an unpopular and at times seemingly 'dan-
gerous' idea." He seems never to have encountered, never even to 
have imagined an idea that was actually dangerous-without mock-
ing quotation marks. As if by legal stipulation, in Walker's version 
of American history, no one can ever have been justified in feeling 
alarm at hostile incitements or malevolent doctrines, so any efforts 
to curb speech, by the same stipulation, must have been, not merely 
constitutionally improper but altogether "irrational" and "hysteri-
cal." This is American history reduced to a meaningless clash be-
tween scarecrows-and squawking crows. His book provides much 
3. Page 12 (emphasis added). 
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evidence that this smug view has been quite congenial to the 
ACLU, itself. 
RED DAWN 
There is, to begin with, the embarrassing matter of the 
ACLU's extended flirtations with the totalitarian left. In its first 
twenty years, Walker concedes, the organization's leading figures 
were "deeply sympathetic to the Soviet Union," viewing it as a 
"bold experiment in economic democracy." Walker cheerfully 
doles out the evidence of this attitude; he does not, however, seem 
to regard it as particularly embarrassing. In Walker's view, sympa-
thy for Stalinist Russia was not at all incompatible with the "de-
fense of American liberty." His history makes clear that such 
lightheadedness has often been characteristic of the ACLU. 
Thus Walker assures us that Roger Baldwin, executive director 
and guiding spirit of the ACLU in its first four decades, was a 
"political moderate who saw nothing basically wrong with society's 
institutions." He even claims that "Baldwin had few illusions about 
either the Communist party or the Soviet Union." But he also tells 
us that after a two month trip to Soviet Russia in 1927, Baldwin 
published an "informative" -and altogether straight-faced-book 
on Liberty Under the Soviets. Almost a decade later, Baldwin was 
still publishing articles praising the "essential liberties" of Stalin's 
Russia. 
At times, Baldwin could be quite boastful about his radical 
outlook. In the mid-1930s he wrote to his Harvard alumni year-
book: "I seek social ownership of property, the abolition of the 
propertied class and sole control by those who produce wealth. 
Communism is the goal." But like many other fellow travellers of 
the 1930s, Baldwin was quite ready to conceal the truth when he 
judged that his ideals-or the interests of the ACLU-so required. 
Thus, for example, in a 1939 radio talk Baldwin insisted that there 
were no actual communists among the ACLU's leadership, when, 
as Walker notes, he knew this claim to be untrue. 
As late as 1939, following the Hitler-Stalin Pact, the ACLU 
did adopt an official policy statement affirming that it was "opposed 
to all totalitarian governments-Fascist, Nazi or Communist-as 
the antithesis of civil liberties." Only "a few weeks later," however, 
it "rescinded" this resolution and refused to adopt a resolution, 
sponsored by socialist Norman Thomas, condemning "the crimes 
against civil liberty committed in Russia." Some years earlier, 
when the ACLU leadership was stung at having been identified as a 
"Communist organization" before the House Un-American Activi-
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ties Committee, Baldwin asked a "leader of the left-wing group" on 
the ACLU Board to prepare a memorandum criticizing the loose 
procedures of congressional investigating committees. The author 
of the memorandum turned out to be, as Walker records, "actually 
a secret Communist party member." 
Professor Walker does not pause to ask how this pattern could 
be consistent with the views of a "political moderate" with "few 
illusions about the Communist Party." But he is not happy about 
the actions of those with fewer illusions. In 1940, the majority on 
the ACLU's executive board finally pushed through a resolution 
condemning communist affiliations as inconsistent with civil liberty 
and then engineered the ouster of board member Elizabeth Gurley 
Flynn, who was simultaneously serving on the National Committee 
of the American Communist Party. To Walker, this action was 
"the one great deviation from principle in ... [the ACLU's] 
history." 
By his own account, Walker's view has become the prevailing 
one within the ACLU. In 1968, the 1940 anti-communist resolu-
tion was rescinded and Elizabeth Gurley Flynn posthumously rein-
stated. At about the same time, the organization also gave up--
"without debate" -the disclaimer it had been appending to its 
briefs since the late 1940s, affirming that it was "opposed to any 
form of police state or single-party state, whether fascist, Commu-
nist or known by any other name." There was some debate when 
the organization entered a civil rights "coalition" in 1962 with the 
National Lawyers Guild, whose ongoing connections with the Com-
munist Party provoked protests from the NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund. But the ACLU decided to go forward with this alliance and 
thus, as Walker concludes, was "laid to rest the lingering ghost of 
anti-Communism within the ACLU." 
By the 1960s, the ACLU's rejection of anti-communism was 
unlikely to have been motivated by a "sympathetic" view of Soviet 
Russia. But Walker takes the anti-anti-Communist position so 
much for granted that he does not even bother to defend it. He does 
not explain what "principle" was violated when the ACLU sought 
to dissociate itself from advocates of tyranny in the 1940s. He does 
not ask whether the organization would today feel bound by the 
same "principle" to accept in its leadership ranks a figure who ad-
vocated racial supremacy and conspired with apartheid forces in 
South Africa, or even one who merely defended right-wing dictator-
ships, in, say, Latin America. All of Walker's study of the ACLU's 
records and all his interviews with its leaders from various eras do 
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not seem to have prompted him to any further reflection on the 
nature of the "principle" at stake in this matter. 
ABSOLUTISM-SOME OF THE TIME-FOR SOME 
CAUSES 
Whatever else may explain the ACLU's susceptibilities to the 
"romance of American communism," Walker's history demon-
strates-again, with astonishing indifference to the implications of 
this fact-that extreme devotion to liberty is not, by itself, a plausi-
ble explanation. For in the course of its history, the ACLU has 
frequently vacillated in its approach to liberty, even to freedom of 
speech. In conflicts between its leftist sympathies and its absolutist 
rhetoric about "liberty," the ACLU has indulged its leftist sympa-
thies-not invariably, but often. 
This was already clear in the 1930s. Again, Walker himself 
provides the evidence. In the mid-1930s, the ACLU refused to con-
demn coercive sit-in tactics by labor unions (which sought not 
merely to withhold labor but to force the shut down of factories): 
"The Civil Liberties Union," it explained, "is not organized to pro-
tect the rights of property." That, at least, was a fairly plausible 
line to draw. But thereafter the ACLU supported efforts by the 
National Labor Relations Board to censor employer pamphlets ar-
guing against unionization: "Freedom of speech is a qualified, not 
an absolute right," the ACLU's "leftist dominated Committee on 
Labor's Rights" explained. When President Roosevelt launched his 
direct assault on the independence of the Supreme Court in 1937, 
the ACLU refused to condemn this move. One of its senior Board 
members explained that "there has been a tendency to exaggerate 
the importance of courts as safeguards of our liberties." 
Sympathy for labor and labor legislation was only one loyalty 
that warped ACLU policy. Anti-fascism was another. Thus, the 
organization protested the activities of the House Un-American Ac-
tivities Committee in general but in the mid-1930s, the ACLU's 
staff counsel privately urged HUAC to investigate Nazi sympathiz-
ers in America. In 1940, the ACLU reversed its longtime position 
in opposition to peacetime conscription. After America entered the 
war, it went so far as to endorse a proposal for controlling the civil-
ian workforce through a comprehensive system of labor conscrip-
tion. Its enthusiasm for the war effort also led the ACLU board to 
adopt an equivocal stance regarding the free-speech rights of fascist 
sympathizers. The ACLU even vacillated in its response to the 
round-up of Japanese-Americans and their incarceration in deten-
tion camps. (It did eventually rise to the defense of Fred Kore-
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matsu and other Japanese-Americans, but on carefully limited 
grounds.) As late as November 1942, nine months after the round-
ups began, Roger Baldwin sent a letter to the army general in 
charge, congratulating him on completing his mission "with a 
minimum of hardship" and with "comparatively few complaints of 
injustice and mismanagement." It was an "utterly incredible state-
ment"-as Walker, himself, protests-but not uncharacteristic of 
the organization's stance in that era. 
There have been similar vacillations regarding religious liberty. 
In the late 1940s, the organization went out of its way to avoid 
hiring a Jewish director lest his "interest in civil liberties ... be 
mistakenly ascribed to his being a member of an oppressed minority 
group." When it began attacking school prayer in the early 1960s, 
the organization went to ridiculous lengths to secure a non-Jewish 
plaintiff and a non-Jewish legal team. It had earlier considered try-
ing to bully Catholics by "expressing our belief that the Church is 
throwing its weight around in a fashion which may ultimately make 
more difficult the preservation of religious and other liberties." 
"One of the ACLU's most important victories" of recent years, ac-
cording to Walker, was its successful lobbying on behalf of "the 
Civil Rights Restoration act, which overturned the Supreme 
Court's 1984 Grove City decision." It does not strike Walker as at 
all incongruous that the organization counts it an "important vic-
tory" when it succeeds in passing legislation designed to punish a 
small religious college-which is what Grove City is-for declining 
to pledge support for bureaucratic definitions of sex discrimina-
tion-which is what the Grove City case was about. 
DEFIANT ... INSIDERS 
Some of these lapses may be written off as unavoidable accom-
modations to irresistible tides of public opinion. But as Walker's 
history makes clear, the ACLU has not wanted to view itself as a 
political or popular organization. Rather, abundant evidence in this 
book suggests that the ACLU always was-and always understood 
itself to be-an organization of superbly well-connected insiders, 
perched far above the sweaty struggles of mere politics. 
From the beginning, Walker reveals, the ACLU "depended on 
inherited wealth"-that is, the contributions of a handful of im-
mensely wealthy donors-to finance its operations. In its earliest 
years, when it championed the cause of conscientious objectors 
against conscription in the First World War, the organization con-
ducted secret negotiations with top legal officials of the War De-
partment-to whom it had quite extensive access: Roger Baldwin 
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simply "assumed," as Walker notes, that he could "have it both 
ways" by both allowing himself to "challenge the government in 
public and also work closely with administration officials behind the 
scenes." In the 1920s, when the ACLU was concerned about the 
operating methods of the new FBI, Baldwin obtained access to the 
highest levels of the Bureau and proceeded to develop a "close 
working relationship" with Director J. Edgar Hoover. When the 
House Un-American Activities Committee seemed to be threaten-
ing the ACLU in the late 1940s, the organization negotiated behind 
the scenes with then Congressman Richard Nixon and HUAC 
Chairman Parnell Thomas. The ACLU's Washington office direc-
tor subsequently used his influence to "help quash a 1955 HUAC 
report attacking the ACLU." 
The public activities of the ACLU often flaunted its superb 
political connections. In 1939, it managed to get the President's 
wife to attend one of its banquets as featured speaker and then got 
the Attorney General of the United States to attend its conference a 
few weeks later. In 1945, the ACLU held an anniversary dinner 
where it received a telegram from President Truman saluting its 
achievements and an "equally lavish" tribute from Governor 
Thomas Dewey, his leading Republican rival. In the same year, 
Roger Baldwin journeyed to the Far East, was immediately received 
by the new military governor of Japan, General Douglas MacAr-
thur, and struck up such a cordial relationship with MacArthur 
that the general subsequently offered his own public tribute to 
"Roger Baldwin's . . . beneficial influence on the course of 
progress." 
Yet with all its enviable political connections, the ACLU did 
not like to think of itself as "political." Roger Baldwin's view was 
that "other organizations represented special interest groups: union 
members, blacks, Jews and so on. Alas, the ACLU was a disinter-
ested group" and so it could never be large. Walker reveals that as 
late as the 1960s, ACLU leaders were reluctant to expand the size 
and influence of regional offices and local bases, which had often in 
the past presented exasperating challenges to the national executive 
board. New national leadership in the late 1960s finally did seek to 
expand the ACLU's regional affiliates and proved that there was a 
substantial constituency for its version of civil liberties: substantial, 
but at two hundred thousand or so (275,000 at its peak, during the 
Watergate battles, from which it declined to 180,000 by the end of 
the 1970s) still not exactly a vast popular movement. 
Litigation evidently remains its principal focus-or as Mr. 
Walker puts it, with his usual modest tone, the ACLU's role has 
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become that of "defining the precise scope of these guarantees [in 
the Bill of Rights] in the modern administrative state." Whether it 
has done well or not in this role, is not something that this book 
explores with the appropriate care. 
Walker devotes all of three pages to explaining how the ACLU 
came to champion a constitutional right to abortion (informing us 
that the ACLU had worked out a scheme of its own, based on fetal 
"viability," five years before Justice Blackmun). He devotes only 
half a page to the organization's stand on the rights of homosexuals; 
he subsequently deplores Bowers v. Hardwick, but does not bother 
to articulate the grounds or the full implications of the ACLU's 
opposing view. With equal dispatch, he takes a mere eight pages to 
zip through a survey of other new "causes" taken up by the ACLU 
in the 1960s and 70s-from the "rights of students" to the "rights 
of the mentally ill," through the "rights" of prisoners, "the poor," 
the "homeless," etc. He tells us, with no apparent sense of the im-
plication of what he is saying, that the underlying "strategy" in 
many of these areas was: "Identify a problem and frame it in civil 
liberties terms." In every case, it appears that the "problem" was 
"identified" by individual ACLU activists rather than by any 
broader social or political forces. And characteristically, Walker 
has very little to say about whether the underlying "problem" -be 
it the quality of inner city schools, the treatment of the mentally ill 
or the pressures of poverty-has actually been at all ameliorated by 
this approach; he has even less to say about whether the putative 
beneficiaries are grateful for the ACLU's interventions. 
But Walker does not fail to mention that the ACLU continued 
to do well in the courts through the 1970s: after winning 90 percent 
of its cases in the 1968-69 Supreme Court term, the ACLU was still 
able to win 62 percent of the Supreme Court decisions in which it 
intervened a decade later. And the cases in which the ACLU chose 
to intervene were the big ones-80 percent of the "landmark" con-
stitutional cases of recent decades were, by Walker's count, brought 
by the ACLU. With a sympathetic Supreme Court-its most pow-
erful political connection of all-the ACLU, through most of the 
1960s and 70s, was not an organization that needed to mobilize 
broad popular support. 
UNCERTAIN PROSPECTS 
In its closing pages, Walker's history takes note of cloudier 
weather for the ACLU in recent years. The organization exper-
ienced membership losses and fundraising difficulties in the late 
1970s. It felt itself increasingly on the defensive as the Reagan ad-
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ministration gave visibility and prestige to the ACLU's opponents 
and began appointing less sympathetic judges to the federal bench. 
The organization's leadership then experienced particularly sharp 
anxiety during the 1988 presidential campaign, when candidate 
George Bush cited his Democratic opponent's support for the 
ACLU as a sign that he was too liberal to lead the American peo-
ple. A poll commissioned by the organization was reassuring in 
some ways, for it showed that 47 percent of those polled retained a 
favorable view of the ACLU. But it also showed that most of those 
polled had never heard of Bush's attacks. How much damage the 
ACLU might have sustained in a more extended attack on its posi-
tions remains open to speculation-and opponents of its positions, 
much more organized and sophisticated than they were twenty or 
thirty years ago, are no doubt speculating hard. 
With new appointments likely to tip the Supreme Court even 
further away from ACLU positions in coming years, the organiza-
tion will presumably have to rely much more on political efforts to 
advance (or defend) its agenda. Professor Walker's history suggests 
that the ACLU is not very well prepared for such efforts. Confident 
of its own good intentions, well-placed with elite connections, the 
organization did not, historically, have to worry much about gener-
ating broad public support for its policies or broad public confi-
dence in its particular recommendations. It has assumed all along 
that "liberty" and "tolerance" are formulas that can be imposed by 
a wise governing elite, rather than virtues to be cultivated by per-
suasive political leaders. 
Let us be fair: the ACLU, at its best, has performed valuable 
services to civil liberty. It may be that the organization will be 
strengthened and improved by greater involvement in the rough 
and tumble of non-judicial politics. Of course, politics may tempt 
the ACLU to greater demagoguery-as in its shrill but successful 
battle against the Bork nomination. Political calculations may also 
place even greater strains on its consistency. But an ACLU that has 
to sell more of its policies by political means will have to think 
harder about how its nostrums appear to those outside its current 
following. And the organization will then have to think harder 
about what its formulations of civil liberty actually have to offer 
American society, apart from ideological gratification. One hopes, 
at least, that the organization will be improved by rethinking; there 
appears to be much room for improvement. 
